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THE FUTURE OF CLASS ACTIONS IN
THE WAKE OF COMCAST V. BEHREND
Megan Toal*

INTRODUCTION

C

lass actions are a unique category of litigation; these types of
cases are an exception to the rule that only named parties are
subject to a disputed matter. 1 In 2013, the Supreme Court of the
United States heard many class action suits, often disputes regarding certification of the class itself. 2 On March 27, 2013, the
Supreme Court decided the antitrust class action suit Comcast v.
Behrend. 3 The central issue in Comcast involved the correct interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 4 This particular rule was designed to “promote judicial economy” through the
use of litigation of multiple plaintiffs who possess common questions of fact and law.5 Because class actions are a different type of
*

J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (quoting Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–03 (1979)) (noting “[t]he class-action device was
designed as ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and
on behalf of the individual named parties only.’”).
2
Lawrence Hurley, Analysis: Big business the winner in U.S. Supreme
Court
class
action
cases,
REUTERS
(June
20,
2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/21/us-usa-court-classactionidUSBRE95K01U20130621, (detailing briefly the big class action disputes that
the U.S. Supreme Court heard this past term, specifically the seven class actions that reached the Court which include: Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct 1184 (2013), Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct 1345 (2013), Genesis Healthcare Corp. v.
Symczyk, 133 S. Ct 1523 (2013), Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct
2064 (2013), Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct 2191 (2013) and American Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct 2304 (2013)).
3
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
4
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
5
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160; See also Califano, 442 U.S. at 700 (holding that
“the class action device saves the resources of both the courts and the parties
by permitting an issue . . . to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule
23).
1
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litigation, it is repeatedly noted that the evidence necessary to satisfy the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification requires a
“rigorous analysis,” and thus the Court explored what this analysis entails. 6
Class actions at the Supreme Court level, including Comcast, often lead to strong and heated divisions on the bench. The
majority opinions [of the current Supreme Court] have generally
sided with the defendants, which are often large corporations. As
a result, many commentators classify the current Court as probusiness and consequently question the future of class actions. 7
Some scholars argue that the class action lawsuit is simply progressing and adapting over time. 8 From the inception of the current Rule 23 in 1966, there have been various phases of interpretation. 9 While the rule had in its foundation the goal for judicial
efficiency, in the early years that was simply not the case. 10 Specifically, courts were faced with difficulties in assessing how best
to manage these types of cases, especially when determining injury, causation, and damages. 11 During the first few decades, the
Court focused on trying common issues and saving individual issues for later, which often led to an increased number of settle-

6
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Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160; See D. Matthew Allen & Amanda Arnold Sansone, The ‘Rigorous Analysis’ Overlay on Current Class Action Jurisprudence,
BLOOMBERG LAW, available at http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitionercontributions/the-rigorous-analysis-overlay-on-current-class-actionjurisprudence/, (describing the evolution of the rigorous analysis since the Rule
23 in current form was adopted in 1966).
7
Hurley, supra note 2.
8
Allen, supra note 6; See also John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action
Rule 23-What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 328 (2005) (noting
the evolution of class action and attributing it to the high monetary stakes now
attached to these types of claims, especially in the products liability and mass
tort fields).
9
Allen, supra note 6 (describing the various stages of interpretation in
how Rule 23 applies to the certification of class actions); See Robert Bone, The
Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2297474 [hereinafter Bone, Misguided]
(explaining the evolution of courts’ interpretations of Rule 23 since the modern
inception of the rule in 1966).
10
Allen, supra note 6; See Robert Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L. J. 1251, 1260 [hereinafter Bone,
Class] (noting that one of the many goals the drafters had in mind when reformulating Rule 23 was judicial efficiency, but that this goal concerned many
people in the business, securities and environmental fields who believed that
they would become targets for enormous amounts of litigation).
11
Allen, supra note 6.
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ments. 12
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court heard General
Telephone Company of Southwest v. Falcon, which was instrumental in the development of class action lawsuits. This case set
forth the standard of “rigorous analysis” that lower courts must
employ in order to properly certify classes under Rule 23.13 This
standard of a “rigorous analysis” led the Court to become even
more selective and skeptical when certifying large diverse classes. 14 From the 1980s through 1995, despite the courts use of the
“rigorous analysis” standard, class certifications were easier to
come by for plaintiffs. 15 Even more importantly—in the context
of Comcast—was the deference given to expert testimony. 16 The
certification of the class at the district court level had great importance because until 1998, a class certification was unchangeable, as there was no vehicle for a party to appeal. 17 However,
courts began to shift in their perception of class actions in 1995,
when appellate courts started decertifying classes. 18 Two years
later, the Supreme Court began issuing opinions that would decertify major class actions suits.19 Courts, including the Supreme
Court, have since taken the rule set forth in Falcon as a strict requirement. 20 Additionally, due to the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, these types of cases increasingly reached the Supreme Court
and thus the process for analyzing class certification became more
defined. 21
12
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Id.; See also Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 729, 737 (2013) [hereinafter Klonoff, Decline] (explaining that very
few class actions actually went to trial, but instead involved high monetary settlements).
13
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 147.
14
Allen, supra note 6.
15
Id.; See Klonoff, Decline supra note 12, at 737 (suggesting that in the
1980s class actions were easier to come by for plaintiffs).
16
Allen, supra note 6; But cf. 1 MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:14
n. 18 (9th ed.) (quoting In re Potash Antitrust Litigation, 159 F.R.D. 682, 687
(D. Minn. 1995)) (holding that “[i]n assessing whether to certify a class, the
Court’s inquiry is limited to whether or not the proposed methods are so insubstantial as to amount to no method at all”).
17
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
18
Allen, supra note 6.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
See generally Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §1453 (2011) (providing avenues for class action disputes so that they may be removed from state
court to federal district courts); See John Campbell, Unprotected Class: Five
Decisions, Five Justices, and Wholesale Change to Class Action Law, 13 WYO.
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The Court no longer examined Rule 23 as a pleading
standard, and although courts previously did not delve into the
merits of the case, it soon became a necessary step in determining
whether certification was proper.22 More importantly, recently
and in large part due to the influential case of Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
the requirement for commonality became more structured. 23 As
often mentioned in dissenting opinions, plaintiff potential classes
have historically satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) quite
easily. 24 Rule 23(a) required that plaintiffs only had to possess one
common question or one common point of unification in order to
meet this requirement. 25 However, the shift from common questions to common answers, which became a large point of contention for the Court in addressing Comcast, had begun.

I. BACKGROUND
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth
the requirements for a class action suit. 26 Plaintiffs must satisfy
the requirements of Rule 23(a) as well as satisfy at least one subsection of Rule 23(b). Typically, fulfilling the prerequisites of Rule
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L. REV. 463, 466–67 (noting four important consequences of CAFA, (1) broadened the scope of federal diversity jurisdiction to include more class action disputes, (2) authorized the removal from state courts, (3) altered the procedure
for class actions, and (4) created regulation for settlement and minimized disparate treatments for diverse class members).
22
Allen, supra note 6; See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2551–52 (2011) (explaining that it is necessary to examine merits in order to
make a proper determination on preliminary matters, including class certification).
23
Allen, supra note 6; See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555 (stating that
“[m]erely showing that Wal-Mart’s policy of discretion has produced an overall sex-based disparity does not suffice” to meet the requirement of commonality); See also Bone, Misguided supra note 9 (stating, “[t]he Wal-Mart Court
made (a)(2) into something stricter. After Wal-Mart, a common question alone
is not enough; the common question must lie at the core of all the claims.”).
24
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ((citing Moore’s
Federal Practice § 23.23[2] (3d Ed. 2011)); See also Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (1986) (noting that under Rule 23(a), “[t]he threshold of ‘commonality’ is not high.”).
25
Allen, supra note 6; but cf. A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 471
(2013) (stating that recently, what matters at the class certification stage is not
common questions, but rather common answers).
26
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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23(a) is a simpler standard for plaintiffs to meet. 27 Prior to 2011,
virtually every potential class met the requirements of Rule
23(a). 28 Because the parties in Comcast did not dispute whether
Rule 23(a) was satisfied, the courts’ analysis consisted of a discussion of Rule 23(b). Historically, 23(b) imposes a slightly stricter
burden for the plaintiffs to meet in order for proper class certification. 29 This subsection denotes the types of class actions that
may be maintained provided that subsection (a) has been satisfied. 30 Rule 23(b)(1) states that a class may be certified if dividing
the class into individuals or smaller sub-classes would create a
risk of either (1) inconsistent rulings for each of the members or
(2) as a practical matter adjudicating individual matters would be
dispositive to the other members’ interests or prevent the other
members from properly protecting their interests. 31 Similarly,
Rule 23(b)(2) holds that the class may be certified if the defendant
acts or fails to act on grounds applicable to the whole class, where
final injunctive or declaratory relief is necessary for the all class
members. 32 The most relevant subsection for this Note, however,
is Rule 23(b)(3) because it was the point of controversy for the
Court in Comcast. 33 Rule 23(b)(3) is often referred to as the predominance requirement since it requires that questions of law or
fact relevant to the class predominate over questions that are
common to individual members. 34
27
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See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.591, 624 (holding
“[e]ven if Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement may be satisfied by that shared
experience, the predominance criterion is far more demanding.”).
28
Robert Klonoff, Reflections on the Future of Class Actions, 44 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 533, 536 (2012) [hereinafter Klonoff, Reflections].
29
Bone, Misguided supra note 9, at 55; See also Rule 23. Class Actions, 1
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and Commentary Rule 23 (noting that
commonality historically was often easily met, and that Rule 23(b) acted more
like a gatekeeper to keep unnecessary suits from progressing forward).
30
1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:27 (5th ed.) (explaining that all requirements set forth in 23(a) must be satisfied, as well as one of the four subsections of 23(b)). As the author addresses it is important to note, while 23(b)
has three subsections 23(b)(1) has two distinct parts. Id. at n. 1.
31
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1).
32
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
33
Comcast, 133 S. Ct at 1433–35.
34
FED R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) which states that,
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if . . . the court
finds that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class
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The main issue in Comcast was an allegation of a breach
of the Sherman Act, which was designed to protect trade and
commerce, and make trusts that would restrict trade or commerce
in any way illegal. 35 Often in an antitrust class action case, before
the merits of the claim can be explored the question of certification must be settled. 36 Rule 23(b)(3) dictates that a class action
must be the most effective method of litigation in adjudicating
the dispute. 37 However, if the defendant(s) are successful, the likelihood that individual class members will pursue smaller or individual actions against the company or corporation in an antitrust
suit is minimal. 38
Historically, there was a liberal approach with respect to
certifying antitrust class actions, in large part because class actions were the best way to treat these types of disputes. 39 However, the treatment of expert testimony in antitrust class actions has
differed, with some courts applying a minimal level of scrutiny to
expert testimony prior to certification. 40 This sentiment of mini-
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members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
and the likely difficulties in managing class action.
35
See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (stating “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal.”).
36
Rabiej, supra note 8, at 328.
37
Bone, supra note 9, at 1260 (suggesting that the 1966 drafters of Rule 23
intended subsection (b)(3) to “further the twin policies of efficiency and substantive norm enforcement.”).
38
See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.
2004) (Posner, J.) (acknowledging that “[t]he realistic alternative to a class action is not seventeen million individual suits, but zero individual suits” and
this is because of the likely cost to individual plaintiffs to litigate against large
corporate defendants).
39
See In re Am. Exp. Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 219 (2d Cir. 2012)
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (U.S. 2012) and rev’d sub nom. Am. Exp. Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (U.S. 2013) (holding that the court is “persuaded by the record before us that if plaintiffs cannot pursue their allegations
of antitrust law violations as a class, it is financially impossible for the plaintiffs to seek to vindicate their federal statutory rights.”).
40
Robert H. Klonoff, Antitrust Class Actions: Chaos in the Courts, 11
Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 14 (2005) [Hereinafter Klonoff, Antitrust] (citing to In
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation 200 F.R.D 326, 348 (E.D. Mich. 2001));
See also In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 826 F. Supp. 1019, 1042 (N.D. Miss.
1993) (holding that “[t] he court’s role at the class certification stage in as-
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mal scrutiny, however, was not applied by all courts or in all cases; additional scrutiny placed on expert witnesses is apparent in
Weisfeld v. Sun Chemical Corp., where the court addressed the
fact that the expert did not provide support for his conclusions. 41
As a result, the court expressed concerns that there would not be
adequate proof to demonstrate that the injury and damages were
on a class-wide basis. 42
The idea of “rigorous scrutiny” evolved from Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 43 While the case did not coin
this term, there was an instructive discussion on the scrutiny that
must be completed with respect to expert testimony. 44 Historically, circuit courts were divided on whether or not and to what extent Daubert applies to class actions. 45 There was some speculation that Comcast v. Behrend would clarify any confusion,
however this was not the case.

II. DISCUSSION - COMCAST V. BEHREND
Comcast Corp v. Behrend, which alleged violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, first went to trial in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 46 Following the decision in In re Hydrogen Peroxide
Antitrust Litigation—which held that simply because the certification requirements and the merits of a claim overlap that does
not excuse a thorough inquiry into ensuring the prerequisites are
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sessing the proposed methods of proving damages is quite limited. The preliminary inquiry is whether or not the proposed methods are so insubstantial that
they amount to no method at all.”); but see In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (noting however, that the district court must
determine that the expert testimony is not so unreliable that it would be inadmissible as a matter of law).
41
Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. Corp., 84 F. App’x 257, 261–62 (3d Cir. 2004).
42
Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. Corp., 210 F.R.D. 136, 144 (D.N.J 2002).
43
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
44
Daubert, 133 S. Ct. at 2792. This case established the standard for expert testimony, specifically stating that at the trial level the judge must determine “that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.” Id.
45
Meredith M. Price, The Proper Application of Daubert to Expert Testimony in Class Certification, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1349, 1356 (2012)
(stating, “the debate between the Seventh and Eighth Circuits centers on
whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert . . . is applicable at the point
of class certification or instead limited to a full application during the merit
portion of a trial.”).
46
Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 264 F.R.D. 150, 153 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
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met—the court granted Comcast’s motion to reconsider whether
certification of the class of plaintiffs was proper. 47 The plaintiffs
put forth four theories of antitrust behavior and while the court
affirmed the certification of the class, it only accepted one of the
theories. 48 The court held the theory that Comcast exhibited
overbuilding behavior, which deterred other competitors from
entering the market, was sufficient to support class certification. 49
In Comcast, the potential class sought certification under
Rule 23(b)(3), which states that certification is proper if the questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over any issues relating to the individual members of the class. 50 Rule
23(b)(3) goes on to require that litigating as a class action must be
the best and most effective way to adjudicate the controversy at
hand.51
The trial court is tasked with performing a “rigorous analysis” of potential class actions when determining if certification is
proper. 52 The Hydrogen Peroxide ruling clarified the definition of
“rigorous analysis” because it specifically requires trial courts to
complete a deep analysis of all factual and legal issues that are
relevant to Rule 23.53 The court need not delve into the full merits
47

Id.
Id. The four theories included: (1) Comcast’s swaps and transactions in
the Philadelphia market eliminated competition and as a result, customers experienced increased prices; (2) the fact that Comcast clustered the Philadelphia
market led to higher rates for basic cable; (3) it was profitable for Comcast to
deny access to regional sports channels which in turn increased the prices of
basic cable subscribers; and (4) Comcast’s clustering prevented over builders
from entered the Philadelphia market, which resulted in higher rates paid by
class members; See also Mark Moller, Common Problems for the Common
Answer Test: Class Certification in Amgen and Comcast, (October 24, 2013)
2013
Cato
Supreme
Court
Review
301,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2344877 (explaining “‘clustering’ is antitrust lingo for
a company’s efforts to concentrate its operations in a particular market, and
Comcast pursued such a strategy in the Philadelphia are through a series of
acquisitions approved by antitrust regulators.”).
49
See Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 153.
50
Id. at 154.
51
Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 154; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
52
Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 154; See 5 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s
Federal Practice § 23.61 [1] (3d ed. 2008) (stating “[p]leading requirements are
distinct from the requirements for certifying a case as a class action. A court
may not and should not certify a class action without a rigorous examination of
the facts to determine if the certification requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)
have been met.”).
53
In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309 (3d. Cir.
2008).
48
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of the case at the certification stage, but may need to hear expert
testimony with respect to the prerequisites of Rule 23. 54 The district court, under Rule 23(b), has the burden of considering
whether the plaintiff’s legal claim may be proven with evidence
at trial that is related to all the class members. 55 In order to succeed on an antitrust allegation, the plaintiffs must prove three essential elements: (1) a violation of section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act; (2) individual injury or impact resulting from the
violation; and (3) measurable damages. 56 Moreover, the plaintiffs
must prove that evidence common to the class will predominate
for each of the elements. 57 At the certification stage, the plaintiffs
need not prove the merits or the effects of antitrust behavior but
must show that each element of an antitrust claim may be proven
at trial by evidence that is common to the class. 58
The plaintiffs believed they could offer evidence through
their damage expert, Dr. McClave, and his model, which described the extent of damages Comcast owed to the class. 59 Dr.
McClave approximated these figures under the assumption that
54

06/02/2014 15:10:17

C M
Y K

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 110 Side A

Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 155; See also 5 Moore’s Federal Practice §
23.46[4] (stating “because the determination of a certification request invariably involves some examination of factual and legal issues underlying the plaintiffs’ cause of action, a court may consider the substantive elements of the
plaintiffs’ case in order to envision the form that a trial on those issues would
take.”).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 156 (quoting In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d. at 311).
57
Id. (quoting Weisfeld v. Sun Chem. Corp., 210 F.R.D. 136, 141 (D.N.J.
2002)); See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 454 (3d Cir. 1977) (explaining that every single class member must prove at least some degree of impact from the alleged antitrust violation).
58
Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 156; See In re New Motor Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding “[i]n antitrust class actions, common issues do not predominate if the fact of antitrust
violation and the fact of antitrust impact cannot be established through common proof.”).
59
Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 156; See also In re Ethylene Propylene Diene
Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 256 F.R.D. 82, 95 (D. Conn. 2009) (discussing the use of a regression model to provide evidence of predominance, specifically noting that “[i]n an antitrust suit, plaintiffs will generally use multiple regression analysis to demonstrate that a ‘conspiracy’ variable has influence
over the dependent variable (price)-that is, class members paid a higher price
than the basic economic principles of supply and demand would otherwise dictate, thus demonstrating collusive behavior was at work.”); See also Behrend,
264 F.R.D. at 169 n. 24 (explaining that “it is undisputed by the experts that
multiple regression analysis is an acceptable and widely recognized statistical
tool for measuring antitrust impact.”).
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all four theories of liability would prevail.60 The court held that
the class could demonstrate a common damage methodology, so it
did not matter that the damage model reflected all four theories
of antitrust behavior rather than solely the accepted over builder
theory, and thus the class was certified. 61
After the unfavorable decision, Comcast appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third District. 62 The court
of appeals ruled that an attack on the methodology is irrelevant
in an inquiry of class certification. 63 At this stage, the court stated
that the plaintiffs need not tie each theory with a precise number
of damages but merely must show that damages could be accurately calculated. 64 The court held that the district court examined the evidence submitted on both sides, which included methodology, conclusions, and present criticisms. 65 The court
determined that the model was still workable despite the use of
all four theories of antitrust conduct in its calculations. 66 The
court emphasized that at the class certification stage the district
court simply must determine whether plaintiffs have demonstrated through a preponderance of evidence that damages may be assessed through common proof. 67 Class certification will not be defeated simply because the calculations may not be exact. 68
While the court affirmed the lower court’s decision, Judge
Jordan put forth a strong dissent.69 The Judge adamantly argued
that the district court used too much discretion in determining
60

Behrend, 264 F.R.D. at 162.
Id. at 191.
62
Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011) cert. granted in
part, 133 S. Ct. 24, 183 L. Ed. 2d 673 (U.S. 2012) and rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 185
L. Ed. 2d 515 (U.S. 2013).
63
Behrend, 655 F. 3d at 207.
64
Id.; See 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 3:14 (9th ed.) (explaining that
the court emphasized that the district court should determine whether the expert’s model can evolve into admissible evidence, not necessarily whether the
evidence offered is perfect at the certification stage).
65
Behrend, 655 F. 3d at 200.
66
Id.; See Campbell, supra note 21, at 476 (describing that the court found
that the expert did not have to perform all the different potential calculations,
but rather it was sufficient that there simply was a method and a formula that
could be used to calculate should the case proceed to trial).
67
Behrend, 655 F.3d at 204.
68
Id. (quoting In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust
Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 26 (1st Cir. 2008) (“We are looking here not for hard factual
proof, but for a more thorough explanation of how the pivotal evidence behind
plaintiff’s theory can be established.”).
69
Behrend, 655 F.3d at 208 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
61
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that certification of the class was proper, holding that the model
failed to demonstrate that common evidence was available to estimate damages applicable to the entire class. 70 He suggested remanding the case in order to determine whether the class needed
to be divided into subclasses to make damages more ascertainable. 71
He further emphasized that the model was irrelevant because it did not solely examine the accepted theory of anticompetitive overbuilding. 72 In order to remedy this discrepancy, Judge
Jordan argued that the court should vacate and require the plaintiffs to adjust the model to reflect only the overbuilding theory,
which later became an issue for the majority once the case
reached the Supreme Court. 73 Judge Jordan emphasized that the
overbuilding theory would only impact the counties in which
RCN was licensed to overbuild, which in fact were only five of
the nineteen counties. 74 This further demonstrated, in Judge Jordan’s mind, that certification of the entire class was improper. 75
A. The Supreme Court’s Majority Opinion
In the majority’s discussion, Judge Jordan’s dissent played
an important role once Comcast brought its case before the Supreme Court of the United States. 76 The Court attempted to answer one important question: whether class certification is proper
if the evidence provided is not clearly admissible. 77 The court
70
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Id. at 210 (Jordan, J., dissenting); See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 311–12 (3d. Cir. 2008) (noting the question of predominance revolves around whether the plaintiffs can prove that antitrust impact is capable at proof at trial which is common to the class, as opposed to the
individual). Judge Jordan asserts that the majority abused its discretion in
finding that this is possible. See also Messner v. Northshore University
HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 823 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that it would be an
“appropriate and limited use of merits evidence at the certification stage” for
defendants “to argue that [an expert’s] methodologies were flawed.”).
71
Behrend, 655 F.3d at 211 (Jordan J., dissenting).
72
Id. at 225 (Jordan, J., dissenting); Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432–35.
73
Behrend, 655 F. 3d at 216 (Jordan, J., dissenting). Judge Jordan held
that the model did not meet the one of the three requirements imposed by Rule
702 and Daubert, specifically arguing that the testimony and facts were not
adequately tied together.
74
Id. at 213.
75
Id. at 225 (Jordan J. dissenting).
76
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1434 (citing Behrend, 655 F. 3d at 216).
77
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426. The court stated that the issue is “whether a
district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff
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voted in favor for Comcast, in a 5-4 decision, with Justice Scalia
writing the majority opinion.78
The Court emphasized that because the model focused on
the plaintiffs’ original argument, which included all four theories
of antitrust behaviors exhibited by Comcast, and failed to
acknowledge the solely accepted theory, class certification was
improper. 79 While the court of appeals affirmed the district
court’s holding, the Supreme Court disagreed, given that the
model’s methodology could be used to show that the damages
were capable of measurement. 80 The majority held that the court
of appeals disregarded precedent that dictates a thorough analysis of whether common issues predominate over individual issues. 81 Because the lower courts saw no purpose in tying the accepted theory of antitrust behavior to the damage model, they did
not meet the required standard. 82 Moreover, without matching
theories of liability to damage calculation, the court of appeals set
the bar for appropriate methodology quite low. 83
Thus, the majority found the plaintiff’s evidence model
lacking, and held the evidence was insufficient to show predominance of issues. 84 The Court emphasized that because the model
focused on the plaintiffs’ original argument, which included all
four theories of antitrust behaviors exhibited by Comcast, and
failed to acknowledge the one accepted theory, class certification
was improper. 85
The Court relied, at least in part, on a Daubert analysis.86
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class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show
the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.” Id.
78
Id. at 1432–35.
79
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433; See Federal Judicial Center, Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence 432 (3d ed. 2011) (stating that “[t]he first step in
a damages study is the translation of the legal theory of the harmful event into
an analysis of the economic impact of that event.”).
80
Comcast. 133 S. Ct. at 1431.
81
Id. at 1433 (stating that “by refusing to entertain certain arguments
against respondents damages model . . . simply because those arguments would
also be pertinent to the merits determination, the Court of Appeals ran afoul of
precedents requiring precisely that inquiry.”).
82
Id.
83
See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433 (stating “under that logic [by refusing to
delve in the merits of the case], at the class certification stage any method of
measurement is acceptable so long as it can be applied classwide, no matter
how arbitrary the measurements may be.”).
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Sergio Campos, Opinion Analysis: No Common Ground, SCOTUS
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The majority only mentioned this briefly because Comcast did
not challenge the admissibility of the plaintiffs’ expert testimony
in district court. 87 Because it was not fully addressed by the
Court, it is unclear specifically to what extent a Daubert analysis
is necessary at the class certification stage. 88
At the heart of this case is the debate over whether a class
must simply have “common questions” or must also have “common answers.” 89 The Court found that there has to be a common
answer to the issue of damages in a class action suit, and because
the plaintiffs failed to provide this, the class cannot and should
not have been certified by the lower courts. 90 The Court held that
the questions relating to individual damage calculations will
outweigh the questions relevant to the class. 91 Thus, the majority
held that in order for a class to be certified there must not only be
common questions, but there must also be common answers.
B. The Supreme Court’s Minority Opinion
The majority opinion prompted a strong dissent by Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan who disagreed on
both procedural and substantive grounds. 92 First and foremost,
the dissent stated that given the reformulation of the original

06/02/2014 15:10:17

C M
Y K

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 112 Side A

BLOG
(March
29,
2013)
available
at:
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/03/opinion-analysis-no-common-ground/; See
generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (establishing how expert testimony must be examined by the court).
87
Id.
88
Id.; See Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, Business Roundtable, and the Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Comcast, 133
S. Ct. 1426 (noting that if a trial court certifies based on expert testimony that
would not withstand a Daubert analysis then the court skirts its gatekeeping
responsibility and allows certification that does not meet the prerequisites set
forth in Rule 23).
89
Allan Dinkoff, Comcast v. Behrend’ Bigger Than We Thought at First
Blush?
N.Y.L.J.,
April
5,
2013,
available
at
http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=11819; See also Richard Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97,
131–32 (2009) (suggesting that “[w]hat matters to class certification. . .is not the
raising of common questions . . .but, rather the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate commons answers apt to drive the resolution of litigation.”).
90
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433–35.
91
Id. at 1430; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
92
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435 (Ginsburg J., & Breyer J., dissenting).
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question, the petition for certiorari should not have been granted.
Instead of hearing and discussing the District Court’s Rule
23(b)(3) analysis and determining error as originally anticipated,
the question shifted into a debate on the admissibility of expert
testimony. 93 Therefore, the parties prepared to argue their point
under the Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and a Daubert analysis. 94 However, as the dissent pointed out, Comcast must have objected to the expert evidence in a timely matter in order for the
claim to be preserved. 95 Because Comcast made no objection, it
forfeited its right to object to the model at the class certification
stage. 96 Thus, the dissent argued that because Comcast forfeited
its right, the writ of certiorari was carelessly granted. 97
Additionally, the dissent addressed the issue of judicial efficiency. 98 They emphasized that when aggregating the plaintiffs
and determining liability common to the class, predominance is
often satisfied, in large part, because it saves time and expense. 99
Further, the dissent cited Butler v. Sears Roebuck & Company,
which held that certification is proper for classes because of efficiency and specifically that predominance is an issue of efficiency. 100 That case established that no bar exists on class certification
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93
Id.; See also Campos, supra note 86 (noting “[t]he Court granted certiorari, but reformulated the question presented as one concerning whether the
expert’s model had to be admissible under Daubert for class certification purposes. Consequently, the justices during oral argument focused on what
standard of admissibility, if any, should apply to evidence like the expert’s
model offered to show a predominance of common issues.”).
94
Comcast 131 S. Ct. at 1435.
95
Id.; See also FED. R. EVID. 103 (setting forth the requirements for
claiming an error in evidence in order to exclude evidence).
96
Comcast, 133 S. Ct at 1436 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting); but
see Brief for Petitioners at 4, Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (stating that Comcast
did preserve its objection by objecting to the use of the model at class certification, and did not also need to separately object to the admission of the expert’s
opinions at the evidentiary hearing).
97
Comcast, 133 S. Ct at 1436 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting).
98
Id. at 1437 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing to 7AAC.
Wright A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1778, 121 (3d
ed. 2005)); See Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 471 (explaining that the class action device
is necessary for permitting issues affecting many parties to be litigated in a
managed, expedited and efficient way).
99
Wight A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1778
121(3d ed. 2005).
100
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1437; See Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702
F.3d 359, 662 (7th Cir. 2012) cert. granted, judgment vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2768,
186 L. Ed. 2d 215 (U.S. 2013) and judgment reinstated, 11-8029, 2013 WL
4478200 (7th Cir. Aug. 22, 2013) (stating “predominance is a question of effi-
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simply because every plaintiff did not suffer from the exact same
issues. 101
The dissent emphasized that the main issue is an antitrust
injury, specifically that the injury must be the type that existing
antitrust laws were designed to prevent. 102 The respondents attempted to prove a violation by noting that Comcast had taken
control of over 60% of the Philadelphia market. 103 This was important for the dissenting opinion, as it noted that the government typically finds any one firm or company owning over 25%
of the market problematic. 104 It was the responsibility of the class
to prove that not only did Comcast have monopoly power, but also that it used that power to charge the plaintiffs higher prices. 105
The class attempted to demonstrate that Comcast asserted
its monopoly power through the regression analysis offered by
their expert, Dr. McClave. 106 The regression analysis in the model
compares the counties included in the class to the counties outside
the class, where the alleged anticompetitive conduct was not
practiced. 107 The model concluded that because of Comcast’s al-
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ciency . . . Is it more efficient, in terms both of economy of judicial resources
and of the expense of litigation to the parties, to decide some issues on a class
basis or all issues in separate trials?”).
101
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1438 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting).
102
Id.; See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328,
334(1990) (quoting Brunswick Corp v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977) (noting that a plaintiff cannot recover under the Clayton Act simply because there may exist a casual link between injury and an illegal presence on
the market, but rather that the injury has to flow from an illegal activity that
existing antitrust laws aim to prevent).
103
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1438 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting).
104
Id. (citing to Dept. of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal
Merger Guidelines § 5.3, 19 (2010)) (explaining how firms that own that large
of a portion of the market gain the ability to charge or raise prices above the
typical competitive levels, thus harming consumers).
105
Id.; See, e.g., Ethylene Propylene, 256 F.R.D. at 88 (offering an explanation of how regression models may be used to prove predominance sufficient
to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)).
106
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1439 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting);
Third Amended Class Action Complaint of the Sherman Antitrust Act at 2
Behrend v. Comcast 264 F.R.D. 150 (2010) (arguing that because Comcast
clusters the market it possess the requisite monopoly power over the region
and can charge supracompetitive prices because of the limited availability of
other cable companies available to customers in the region).
107
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1439 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting). Dr.
McClave used a “but-for” model suggesting what prices would have looked
like “but-for” Comcast’s alleged antitrust actions. See Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 485 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating “using a ‘but for’ damage
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leged behavior, consumers in the affected market were paying
over 13% more for their subscription services. 108 While the model
was the point of contention for Comcast and basis for the majority’s decision, the dissent adamantly argued that it was sufficient. 109
The minority examined the issue of admissibility with regards to the contested damage model offered by the plaintiffs. 110
The purpose of the model was to demonstrate that Comcast’s antitrust behaviors led Comcast subscribers to pay higher prices
than if there had been competitors in the Philadelphia region. 111
The model was not used to determine damages, but rather to
prove liability. 112 Therefore, the dissent did not believe that the
district court abused its discretion in finding that the model
could, in theory, determine damages suffered by the class even
though the model included all theories of liability, not just the
successful theory. 113 The dissenting justices stated that it could be
used to measure damages for the accepted overbuilder theory, in
large part, because Comcast argued that the other theories, which
were not accepted by the lower courts, did not impact prices. 114
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer further argued that, if Comcast’s
contention was correct, then the model could accurately depict
the difference in price due to the overbuilding theory. 115 In essence, the dissent believed the model served enough of a purpose
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model arguably makes it impossible for the trier of fact to determine what, if
any, injury derived from the defendant’s antitrust violations as opposed to
other factors and courts sometimes reject such models as the basis of either
causation or amount of injury.”).
108
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1439 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting).
109
Id.; See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 589 n. 5 (1996) (Scalia
J., dissenting) (emphasizing the typical rule is that the Supreme Court will not
review findings of fact by the lower courts when they agree except in extraordinary circumstances where there is clearly an error).
110
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1439 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting); See
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reference Guide on Multiple Regression, 181, 186–88
(Federal Judicial Center, 2d ed.2000) (noting that expert’s choices are crucial
when creating the regression model, the model must be correctly established,
including properly choosing the variables, in order for results to be valid).
111
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1439 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting).
112
Id. at 1441. The dissent adamantly argued “Dr. McClave’s model
does not purport to show how Comcast’s conduct led to higher prices in the
Philadelphia area. It simply shows that Comcast’s conduct brought about
higher prices. And it measures the amount of subsequent harm.”
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
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to affirm the lower courts certification of the class. 116

IV. ANALYSIS OF - COMCAST V. BEHREND
A. Majority’s Analysis
Justice Scalia in the majority opinion stated that Comcast
is “a straightforward application of certification principles.”117
The majority appears to have made the stronger argument especially under the understanding that class action suits are without
a doubt evolving in the legal arena. 118 As Part I suggests, class actions have developed since Rule 23 was first established in
1966. 119 The majority had the opportunity to answer the question
of whether Daubert needed to be applied in the “rigorous analysis” standard employed by the lower courts prior to class certification. 120 As the minority addressed, the lack of a Daubert discussion by the majority in Comcast was likely the consequence of
Comcast never raising an issue about Dr. McClave’s model early
on and therefore waiving its right to object. 121
While the Court may have missed an opportunity to provide clarity about the scope or application of a Daubert analysis
in class action suits, it reemphasized important procedural aspects of class actions. 122 The Court emphasized that a determina116

Id.
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433; See also Bone, Misguided supra note 9 at
44 (noting that “[t] he Court purported to simply apply the ‘rigorous analysis’
standard of proof for certification that Wal-Mart endorsed, which includes a
serious merits review.”).
118
Allen, supra note 6; See Linda S. Mullenix, Putting Proponents to
Their Proof: Evidentiary Rules at Class Certification, 6 (The University of
Texas School of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No.
416 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2276088 [hereinafter Mullenix,
Proponents] (acknowledging the evolution of class actions, specifically in the
last two decades where there the “rigorous standard” analysis is increasingly
being applied by all levels of the federal courts).
119
Allen, supra note 6.
120
Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 12.
121
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J. dissenting).
122
Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118 at 12; See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at
1432 (explaining that Rule 23 is not merely a pleading standard, but rather the
plaintiffs must not only satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a), but also
clearly satisfy, through evidentiary proof, a subsection of Rule 23(b)). Comcast
took the majority opinion in Wal-Mart a step further and extended its analysis
regarding 23(a) to 23(b). Therefore, an even closer look is now required to determine if plaintiffs adequately satisfy 23(b).
117
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tion of class certification must involve an analysis that delves
deep into the requirements set forth in Rule 23. 123 This further reiterates the movement away from an Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin standard where class certification did not involve any analysis
into the merits of the case. 124 The recent trend has been towards
applying a Daubert analysis, even without explicitly referring to
it as that, when analyzing and evaluating the weight of expert
testimony. 125 This is because if expert testimony were simply accepted on its face, virtually all classes would be certified. 126
In 2003, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules removed
the provision permitting conditional class certification, which
suggests an even greater importance placed on conducting a deep
analysis prior to class certification. 127 While judges still have the
discretion to reassess certification at a later stage, often times this
is no longer practiced. 128 This further emphasizes that when a
class is certified it should not be a light or conditional decision. 129
123
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Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118 at 12; See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 147
(emphasizing that it is sometimes necessary to delve beyond the pleadings in
order to determine if the Rule 23 prerequisites to certification are satisfied, and
certification is proper only in the event that a district court completes a rigorous analysis prior to certification).
124
Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 12; See also Eisen, 417 U.S. at
177 (holding that that “nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 . . .
gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of
a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action”).
125
Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 24; See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at
2553–54 (noting that the Court disagreed with the district court’s finding that
Daubert did not apply to expert testimony prior to certification).
126
Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 24; See Comcast, 133 S. Ct at
1433 (quoting Behrend, 655 F.3d at 206 holding the court of appeals simply
concluded that respondents “provided a method to measure and quantify
damages on a class-wide basis,” finding it unnecessary to decide “whether the
methodology [was] a just and reasonable inference or speculative.”). If the bar
were lowered for class certification then very large classes may be certified
even though there may be multiple issues present. This would prove to be
problematic for both plaintiffs and defendants. Plaintiffs may not have their
issues fully represented, and defendants would face difficulties addressing all
the various issues in one case.
127
Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 25; See Wright, Miller &
Cooper 7AA FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1785.4 (describing
decertification of prior certification orders).
128
Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 25.
129
Id.; See also In re Constart Int’l Inc. Sec. Litig., 585 F.3d 774, 780 (3d
Cir. 2009) (quoting Newton, 259 F.3d at 162) (“[c]lass certification is an especially serious decision, as it ‘is often the defining moment in class actions (for it
may south the “death knell” of litigation on the part of plaintiffs, or create un-
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The issue for the majority, as the dissent addressed, is that
Comcast never brought up specific objections to the plaintiff’s
proffered expert testimony until later in the lawsuit. 130 The tough
questions regarding admissibility and reliability of the evidence
should have been addressed before the class was certified. As the
majority correctly asserted, because the lower courts simply certified the class without undertaking a more in-depth look at the
expert testimony, it was unclear if certification was proper.131 Because appellate courts often give great deference to a trial court’s
certification of the class, the original determination of proper certification must not be handed down lightly.132 Therefore, while
the majority’s holding in Comcast provides further clarification
for the requirements of Rule 23(b), it does not fully address the
deference that must be awarded to expert testimony in determining if the evidence meets the requisite standards.
B. Dissent’s Analysis
While the dissent did not believe that Comcast sets forth
any future standards, which it certainly does, it did present many
strong arguments that must be acknowledged. Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer argued that this decision did not create any new black
letter law, but they failed to acknowledge that the holding clarifies for lower courts and future class action suits the strict requirement of a rigorous analysis. 133 When the Supreme Court de-
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warranted pressure to settle nonmeritorious claims on the part of the defendants).
130
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435–36 (Ginsburg J. dissenting).
As it turns out, our reformulated question was inapt. To preserve a claim of
error in the admission of evidence, a party must timely object to or move to
strike the evidence . . . Comcast did not object to the admission of Dr.
McClave’s damages model under Rule 702 or Daubert Consequently, Comcast
forfeited any objection to the admission of Dr. McClave’s model at the certification stage. At this late date, Comcast may no long argue that respondents’
damages evidence was inadmissible.
131
Id. at 1434–35. The majority asserts that the lower court, where certification was deemed proper, did not employ the necessary level of scrutiny.
132
See, e.g., Behrend, 655 F.3d at 189 (citing Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d
at 312) (reinforcing the importance of class certification for both plaintiffs and
defendants).
133
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1437 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting); See
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316 (holding that the requirements of Rule 23
do not only apply to the pleadings, but also often “overlap between a class certification requirement and the merits of a claim”, but a rigorous analysis is still
necessary).
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cided the decertification of the class they noted that the predominance requirement set forth in this rule was a “demanding” one. 134
While the dissent emphasized the dictum offered in Amchem, its
argument is not as strong as the majority’s because Amchem also
reinforced the principles of the “rigorous analysis” required by
Falcon. 135
The dissent, or at minimum Justice Kagan, seemed to suggest that the current bench cannot find a class action suit it finds
compelling. 136 While the rigor of class certification has increased
over time, there is a concern that overly strict standards will remove the only vehicle for litigation plaintiffs may possess.137 Given that this may be the only option, plaintiffs would logically
want a certain level of judicial scrutiny placed on the evidentiary
record. 138 This would in turn prevent large corporate defendants
from including inadmissible evidence, which would obliterate the
possibility for class certification. 139 Thus, while certain justices
might be concerned with the trend that class actions appear to be
taking in the 21st century, it seems that there are advantages not
only for class action defendants, but also for the potential class
plaintiffs. 140
However, the concern regarding access to justice for these
plaintiffs is not without merit. 141 At the same time, despite the
clarification and rigorous analyses now being employed during
class action certification, litigants continue to pursue this type of

134

Klonoff, Antitrust supra note 40, at 4 (quoting Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at

135
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Id.
Hurley, supra note 2.
137
Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 17 stating “[d]efendants should
recognize and concede that a denial of class certification in some types of cases
may indeed leave many plaintiffs without effective representation.”
138
Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 21; See Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676
(noting that once a class is certified in the district court, in most circumstances
this is the final word on the subject).
139
Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 21.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 28; See Whirlpool, 678 F.3d at 421 (explaining that the cost of litigation is a large enough deterrent for individuals contemplating pursuing an
alternate litigation route than class action); See also Suzette M. Malveaux,
How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal- Mart, 106 NW.
U. L. REV. Colloquy 34, 37 (2011) (explaining how when individuals with
small claims are often deterred from challenging large corporations or other
employers because of the many procedural hurled and how this “effectively
immuniz[es] companies from complying with the law.”).
136
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action. 142 While advocates of class actions make strong arguments
that increased rigor is now being employed in class determinations, there is often a failure to accept that this additional rigor is
fostering a more just system. 143
C. Congressional Intervention to Clarify Rule 23 and its
Evolving Interpretations
Some scholars suggest that the Court may not be the most
effective mechanism for clarifying the requirements of Rule 23. 144
One suggestion included the recommendation that Congress enact an amendment that would provide judges the opportunity to
use discretion when determining whether class actions would be
the best way to remedy the issue at hand.145 However, this approach seems problematic because it would cause likely a lack of
consistency throughout the law based on jurisdiction or even
based on judge. Without clarification regarding how deep the evidence must be examined, there is opportunity on both sides for
parties to provide inadmissible evidence as support for why class
certification is or is not proper. 146 In the event Congress would
not want to add an additional amendment, but may wish to provide further clarification than what the courts have offered, there
is opportunity for additional Advisory Committee Notes. 147
The options for further clarification are not limited to revising the Rules of Civil Procedure, but may also include editing
the Manual for Complex Litigation. 148 This text is a judicial
handbook published by the Federal Judicial Center, which offers
insight into how the judiciary should best manage complex litiga-
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Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 29.
See Id. (suggesting “[w]hat the past twenty years teaches is that the
class certification process has become better, not worse, and has improved the
quality of lawyering and judicial decision-making.”); See also Robert Bone &
David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J.
1251, 1305 (explaining that “an erroneous denial of certification does not necessarily doom the class action completely . . . the named plaintiffs, if they continue with individual suits, might be able to obtain later reconsideration of a negative certification decision when more information is available”).
144
Mullenix, Proponents supra note 118, at 13.
145
See Proposed Rules: Amendments to Federal Rules, 167 F.R.D. 523,
559 (1996) (proposed Rule 23(b)(3)(F)).
146
Mullenix, supra note 118, at 16.
147
Id. at 17.
148
Id. at 32.
143

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 116 Side A

142

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 116 Side B

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Toal Article2.docx (Do Not Delete)

5/21/2014 2:44 PM

Loyola Consumer Law Review

566

Vol. 26:3

tion. 149 Federal judges who seek clarification on certain litigation
matters often look to this handbook for guidance. 150 In its current
form, the Manual does not provide insight into the evidentiary
standard that must be observed at the time of class certification. 151 Therefore, one suggestion is for this text to be revised to
provide further insight, if the Court wishes to avoid drastically
altering black letter law. 152
Because the majority in Comcast at least somewhat dove
into the admissibility standards, it was not—as the minority believed—a case that will be irrelevant in future matters. Since the
Supreme Court in Comcast reiterated to lower courts that there
must be meaningful scrutiny especially in terms of Rule 23(b),
further guidance is offered into the standards that must be met
for certification to be proper. 153 By clarifying the need for judicial
scrutiny, this decision greatly impacts the future of class actions
and prevents the abuse from plaintiff attorneys asserting that
class action is the only option, when individual suits may very
likely suffice. 154

V. IMPACT
Undoubtedly, the main consequence of this case is an increased burden on potential class action plaintiffs and an increased difficulty for class actions to survive judicial review, in
large part, because the holding places a higher burden on consumers to prove that injury exists before damages can be properly
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See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) (2004)
(offering federal judges guidance on best practices for various litigation matters, including class actions).
150
Mullenix, supra note 118, at 32; See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) §23.25 (2004) (providing that Rule 702 and Daubert
have “always required that expert testimony ‘assist the trier of fact’ to understand evidence or resolve issues in the case”).
151
Mullenix, supra note 118, at 32; See also Joanna C. Schwartz, Gateways and Pathways in Civil Procedure, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1652, 1685 (2013)
(explaining the extent in which the Manuel For Complex Litigation offers
guidance for litigating class actions).
152
Mullenix, supra note 118, at 32 (stating “[r]evising. . .to include. . . a
specific evidentiary requirement has the virtue of providing federal judges
with an authoritative source upon which to rely in determining on how to
properly evaluate class certification motions.”).
153
Id. at 17.
154
Id.
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Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435.
Id.
157
Shepard Goldfein & James Keyte, ‘Comcast Corp. v. Behrend’: Yet
More Rigor for Certifying Class Actions, 249 N.Y. L. J. No. 97 (May 21, 2013).
158
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435.
159
Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 140 (stating “[t]here are some situations where
courts have determined that a case is not manageable as a class action because
of the necessity for individualized damages determinations.”).
160
Allen, supra note 6.
161
Id.
162
Id.
156
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awarded. 155 Consumers must provide admissible evidence displaying eligibility, on a class-wide basis, for damages at the certification stage before the case may move forward. 156
The most practical impact stemming from the holding in
this case is that Rule 23(b)(3) now requires a much more rigorous
analysis, which would need to occur when determining liability,
causation, and damages. 157 While the rule does not require damages to be exact, damages need to be consistent with the liability
theory. 158 Plaintiffs must demonstrate that damages can be established on a class-wide basis, but defendants can usurp the classification of a class if they can prove individual damages. 159 In
practical effect, this likely means that class certification may occur later in the legal process than in past cases. 160 Practically
speaking, this will likely be beneficial for the plaintiff class because it will allow them more time to prepare discovery and solidify their argument, ensuring that class certification is proper. 161
Ultimately, this will increase their chances for recovery. 162 Defendants should also now be aware of the importance of making
an argument for a Daubert analysis early on in the proceedings.
This case further emphasizes that expert evidence may not
be sufficient if it does not tie the accepted legal theory behind the
suit to the calculation of damages. This seems to create an even
greater burden on plaintiffs who, as in Comcast, allege multiple
theories of liability. Hypothetically, experts then would be required to calculate damages for each individual theory and the
various combinations of theories; thus, if the district court had
held that two of the four proposed theories of antitrust behavior
were supported, then the damage model would have to include
solely those two accepted theories.
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A. Supreme Court Cases in the Wake of Comcast: Additional
Roadblocks Implemented by the Roberts Court to Class
Actions
Comcast is not the only class action dispute that received
much attention. 163 Out of the seven class action related cases recently heard by the Court, only one decision was in favor of the
plaintiff class. 164 This recent trend places a greater burden on
consumers who now have to demonstrate their compliance with
Rule 23 in a greater way. While at face value, some may argue
that this is detrimental to consumers in general, there may be
deeper benefits. The Comcast holding ensures that class action
suits with the most merit will be heard as opposed to cases where
a class is improperly certified in the first instance.
The final case the Supreme Court heard on class actions
this term was American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant,
which resulted in another strong dissent that alleged the current
make up of the bench would greatly diminish the future of class
action suits. 165 The majority held that the Federal Arbitration
Act (“Act”) does not permit the judiciary to nullify an arbitration
agreement that contains a contractual waiver preventing class actions simply because the cost of individual litigation or arbitration would exceed the recovery. 166 This suit began as a dispute

163
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The seven cases include: Comcast, 133 S. Ct. 1426, Amgen, Inc. v.
Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013), Standard Fire Ins.
Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013), Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk,
133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013), Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064
(2013), Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191 (2013) and American Express, 133
S. Ct 2304.
164
Hurley, supra note 2 (discussing Amgen which was the only business
defendant this past term which lost in class action case, but many argue that
this was extremely limited in application); See generally Amgen, Inc. v. Conn.
Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1384 (2012).
165
American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan,, J., dissenting).
166
Id. at 2312; See Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky”
Artbitration Clauses?: The Use of Arbitration Clauses after Concepcion, 13
(August 15, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2306268 (asserting that
the court had in large part decided in favor of enforcing the arbitration agreement because there was no Congressional intervention requiring the court to
reject arbitration agreement); See also id. at 14 n. 73 (suggesting “Congress
might enact legislation restricting the enforceability of arbitral class waivers,
although the prospects of any statutory change are slight. In addition, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has authority to regulate arbitration clauses in consumer financial services contracts under Section 1028(b) of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, after it completes its
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about an arbitration clause’s waiver of class action suits between
petitioners, American Express, and respondents, who were merchants that accept American Express credit cards as payment. 167
The respondents, as in Comcast, alleged a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and a violation of the Clayton Act. 168 However, per the terms of the arbitration agreement, to fight American
Express on the alleged violation would be a foolish undertaking
due to the many procedural bars set forth in the agreement. 169
American Express involved a question of legality regarding an
arbitration clause in a contract with American Express that prevents any opportunity to resolve the dispute. 170 The Court attempted to answer how the Act affects arbitration clauses and the
effect on consumers or small businesses that conduct business
with large corporations. 171 These arbitration agreements prevent
class actions from forming. 172 This decision in large part affirmed
the Court’s previous ruling in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion that
held that arbitration agreements could prevent consumers from
forming classes for suit under state law. 173 The general principle
of the Act is that arbitration agreements, regardless of antitrust
claims, are contractual and therefore, must be rigorously en-
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statutorily mandated study. See 12 U.S.C. 5518(b) (offering a vehicle to restrict
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration).
167
American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2304.
168
American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2306; See also Brief for Respondents at
5–6 American Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12133) (providing details of the plaintiffs claims against American Express).
169
American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310.
170
Id. at 2307; See also 1 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 2:14 (9th ed.)
(discussing the common law contract defense of unconscionability may be used
as a tool to overcome certain provisions that may prevent an opportunity to
litigate).
171
American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2307.
172
See generally CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012)
(reiterating that the Federal Arbitration Act mandates courts to enforce arbitration agreements in all circumstances except when there is exists congressional intent suggesting otherwise); but see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. SolerChrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (noting that nothing in the
Sherman Act suggests that Congress had the intention of preventing a waiver
of class-action procedure).
173
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) involved a class
of consumers who alleged that ATT fraudulently advertised free cellphones for
individuals who sign up for cellphone service and contract. However, the Federal Arbitration Act preempted the law in California (the state in controversy)
law, which held that arbitration agreements are unenforceable if they prevent
consumers from forming a class.
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9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West).
American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2307.
176
Id. at 2308; but cf. Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (stating that Court may decline to enforce an arbitration
agreement if costs of arbitration are so high that they preclude individuals
from asserting their rights under the agreement).
177
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433.
178
American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2312; See Rodriguez v. United States,
480 U.S. 52, 525–26 (1987) (noting that antitrust laws do not guarantee that a
path to remedy will be affordable for all potential plaintiffs).
179
American Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
180
Id. at 2320 (Kagan J., dissenting).
181
Id. at 2312 (Kagan J. Dissenting) (arguing that this decision bypasses
years of precedent that aim to prevent arbitration clauses from preventing consumers from having any mechanisms for remedy or redress).
175

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 118 Side B

forced. 174
In support of their motion, petitioners offered evidence
that demonstrated the cost of obtaining expert evidence that
would be necessary to prove the existence of support for antitrust
allegations. 175 The petitioners’ expert witness, an economist, noted that for an individual trying to prove his or her contention, the
cost would be at least several hundred thousand dollars with the
possibility of an even greater cost. 176 This is important in light of
the majority’s rationale in Comcast, which forces plaintiffs to
match theories of liability with provable damages. 177 Thus, in the
event that multiple consumers can come together to form a class,
the cost for expert analysis in support of their contentions would
be even more costly which alone, may constitute a great enough
deterrent for many who feel intimidated to go up against large
corporations, primarily because of financial reasons. Although the
Court of Appeals held that the waiver was unenforceable because
of its deterring effects, the Supreme Court held that the subject
arbitration agreement must be treated as a contract and thus was
enforceable. 178
As in Comcast, this case led to a strong split in the bench
and another heated dissent. 179 Justice Kagan led this charge and
stated that the current conservative majority will likely never
find a class action that it finds acceptable. 180 The dissent presented a valid opinion that the arbitration agreement, due to the
many procedural bars it required, insulated American Express
from any liability stemming from potential antitrust behaviors,
and leaves merchants who accept this type of credit card with
limited recourse. 181
Does American Express burden the consumer even more
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than the strict requirements set forth in Comcast? It would appear so. It has been suggested that congressional interference
would help clarify, specifically in antitrust disputes the relationship between the Federal Arbitration Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act. 182 The worry expressed by a passionate Justice Kagan,
was that the Federal Arbitration Act had the potential to insulate
corporations or large entities from any liability, because of the
limitations prescribed by the arbitration clause. 183 However, the
majority held that, given the absence of any clarification or intervention by Congress, contract law must govern. 184 While the
Federal Arbitration Act dictated in this case, American Express
creates yet another impediment to the future of class action suits.
B. The Uncertain Future of the Role of a Daubert Analysis in
Class Actions
While Comcast may provide clarity in the strict interpretation of Rule 23 and the importance of a “rigorous analysis” at the
class certification stage, not all issues have been resolved. 185
When the case reached the court of appeals, the question for the
judges pertained to the applicability of the Daubert analysis in
class action cases. 186 Under the Daubert analysis, it is the responsibility of the judge at the trial level to determine that evidence,
including expert testimony, offered by both sides is relevant and
reliable. 187 The Supreme Court has applied this rule to expert tes182
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Philip Bump, The Problem with the Supreme Court’s AmEx Decision,
Class Action, and You, THE ATLANTIC WIRE (June 20, 2013),
http://www.thewire.com/national/2013/06/supreme-court-american-expressitalian-colors/66443/. Because both the Federal Arbitration Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act are federal statutes, neither can override each other. See
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (describing that preemption only applies where a
federal law and a state law conflict, but there is no statutory basis suggesting
the solution when two federal laws conflict).
183
Bump, supra note 182 (quoting Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in Comcast, “the monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to insist on a contract effectively depriving its victim of all recourse.”).
184
Id.
185
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433.
186
Behrend, 655 F.3d at 216; See Goldfein, supra note 157 (discussing to
what extent Daubert applies to the examination of expert testimony in class
certification).
187
Klonoff, Antitrust, supra note 40, at 17 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 507 U.S. 579 (1993)) (noting, “the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”).
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timony in the examination of principles, methodology, and conclusions.188 Because Daubert was not a class action dispute, there
has been some uncertainty on the application of the standard in
class actions. 189 Early Supreme Court cases, including Eisen, never performed a Daubert analysis because courts at that time were
often hesitant to delve into the merits of the case at the certification stage. 190 However, the shift to a deeper analysis is evident by
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. 191
Some suggested that the Supreme Court in Comcast would
determine whether Daubert needs to be raised as a challenge by
the defendants or if it even has a place in the class certification
process. 192 When the Supreme Court granted certiorari it reformulated the question, to determine if the expert’s model needed
to be admissible under the Daubert analysis for the purposes of
proper class certification. 193 However, the Daubert analysis was
never fully raised by Comcast in the lower courts despite the burden being placed on the defendants to raise this issue at trial. 194
188
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Klonoff, Antitrust, supra note 40, at 17. However, the author suggests
that lower courts have often refused to apply Daubert at the certification level
in class action antitrust suits. This stems from the belief that only a preliminary inquiry is necessary at the certification stage. See, e.g., In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 996 F. Supp. 18, 26 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (holding that
deciding the admissibility of expert testimony under the Daubert standard is
not necessary at the class certification stage). However, this sentiment is
evolving after Comcast.
189
Mullenix, Proponents, supra note 118, at 24 (noting that in recent years,
even without an explicit Daubert rule in regards to class actions, courts have
begun to delve more into the essence of both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ expert
testimony offered, in large part because blindly accepting a plaintiff’s expert
testimony would result in certification for virtually every class before the
court).
190
See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177 (holding that the language in Rule 23 does
not suggest that the court has authority to conduct an inquiry into the merits of
the suit at the class certification of stage).
191
See Campbell, supra note 21, at 472–73 (noting that Wal-Mart established a heightened standard for what qualifies as a “common question”, and
due to this, the future of successful nationwide or regional discrimination class
actions appears bleak).
192
Gordon, supra note 189, at 2.
193
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1435 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer J., dissenting); See
Campos, supra note 86 (explaining how the original question was altered by
the Court and how this impacted its decision).
194
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1436 (Ginsburg J. & Breyer, J., dissenting); See
Gordon, supra note 189, at 2 (noting that Comcast was a perfect opportunity
for the Supreme Court to resolve the role of Daubert at the certification stage,
but the Supreme Court had valid reason to not fully address it because Com-

35126-lcr_26-3 Sheet No. 120 Side A

06/02/2014 15:10:17

Toal Article2.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014

The Future of Class Actions

5/21/2014 2:44 PM

573

Typically, when an objection is made in respect to a Daubert
analysis, the court conducts an inquiry regarding the class certification on the testimony presented. 195 Instead, the Comcast majority focused on the degree of rigorousness required under 23(b)(3)
inquiries. 196 Thus, while the Court had the opportunity to provide
a clear rule for the role of Daubert, it did not do so and that determination will need to be made in a future case.
C. Difficulties of Interpretation of Comcast in the Lower Courts
While the dissenters in Comcast correctly asserted that the
case does not create new black letter law, 197 they failed to
acknowledge the implications this may have on future class action cases at the certification stage. 198 The Seventh Circuit has
heard numerous class action suits since the opinion in Comcast
was decided. 199 The issue of common questions versus common
answers was apparent in the subsequent case RBS Citizens v.
Ross, which was a smaller class action suit involving allegations
of violations of Illinois’ overtime laws. 200 The Seventh Circuit
upheld the certification of class, where the employer, RBS, contended that the plaintiff failed to identify a common issue because
of the many individual liability inquiries that were present. 201
The court held that this class was comprised of only about 2,000
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cast failed to raise the issue early in the case).
195
Klonoff, Antitrust, supra note 40, at 18; See Visa Check, 280 F.3d at
132, n. 4 (explaining that “Daubert requires an inquiry distinct from that for
evaluating expert evidence in support of a motion for class certification.”).
196
Goldfein, supra note 157; but see Campbell, supra note 21 (suggesting
that Comcast implies that courts should now “engage in Daubert analysis and
rigorous second-guessing of the plaintiffs’ claims, rather than simply considering whether, if the evidence is persuasive to the jury, the plaintiffs could prove
their case.”).
197
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1436 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting).
198
See Bone, Misguided, supra note 9, at 50 (theorizing that the holding in
Comcast will make issue classifying more difficult because it requires not only
a common question of fact or law, but also common damages).
199
Hurley, supra note 2.
200
Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 667 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013). Current and former bank
employees filed the case alleging that the RBS Citizens denied them overtime
pay in violation of both the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (IMWL). For the IMWL claim, the district court certified
two classes, one for hourly workers and one for Assistant Branch Manager
employees.
201
Dinkoff, supra note 89.
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individuals and the type of evidence necessary to offer was easily
distinguished. 202 The United States Supreme Court granted the
motion to vacate and remand, signaling that the decision in Comcast will not be treated lightly. 203 This further denotes that not only must plaintiffs establish, during the certification stage, that
damages may be calculated on a class-wide basis, but further
again emphasizes the importance of common answers to causation and damages at the trial level.
Another class action dispute, Butler v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., arose out of the Seventh Circuit. 204 Judge Posner wrote the
opinion, which overturned the district court’s holding, and granted certification of the class. 205 While the lower court disagreed,
plaintiffs alleged that they met their burden of proving the requirements of certification were satisfied.206 Judge Posner in his
opinion held that the class should be certified as a matter of judicial efficiency. 207 This conflicts with the holding in Comcast, because not all of the plaintiffs suffered the alleged problem disput-

202

Id.
See RBS Citizens, N.A. v. Ross, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013) (holding that the
judgment is vacated and remanded back to the seventh circuit given the decision in Comcast); See also Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 2013 WL 1316452
(N.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding in light of Comcast the request for certification under
Rule 23(b)(3) is denied in a wage and hour case because plaintiffs did not successfully demonstrate that damages could be calculated on a class wide basis).
204
Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2768, and judgment reinstated, 2013 WL
4478200 (7th Cir. Aug. 22, 2013). This case involved a consumer class action
against a retailer of washing machines alleging problems of mold and a defect
causing washing machines to suddenly stop.
205
Butler, 702 F.3d at 364; See Whirlpool Corp., 678 F.3d at 421(holding,
in a factually similar case, that both the elements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3)
were satisfied).
206
Butler, 702 F.3d at 361. This case involved two separate suits. There
were two classes of individuals, one that suffered from a mold claim and another that suffered from a defect causing the machine to stop. The district
court denied certification to the class who complained of the mold problem
and certified the class with the defect in the control unit. Plaintiffs for the
mold claim put forth evidence to support certification under Rule 23(b)(3), the
court determined that this evidence was sufficient in reversing the district
court’s denial of certification.
207
Butler, 702 F.3d at 364; See also Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151
F.3d 402, 410 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[i] t is important to remember that
the class action device exists primarily, if not solely, to achieve a measure of
judicial economy, which benefits the parties as well as the entire judicial system.”).
203
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ed. 208 The petition for certiorari raised two questions: specifically
(1) whether Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement could be
met on the grounds that it would be more judicially efficient to
try the single common question as opposed to also considering the
individual differences and varying issues of the individual class
members; and (2) whether a class can be certified even though a
majority of the members did not experience the dispute at issue. 209
The petition to the Supreme Court was granted, vacated
and remanded for further consideration given the decision in
Comcast. 210 While it appears that Judge Posner would likely
agree with the dissent in Comcast, the holding appears to be reinforced and unchanging. 211 This further suggests the Supreme
Court is adamant on the application of Comcast in subsequent
cases and that judicial efficiency is not simply a way to usurp the
ruling.
In the wake of these cases, it appears that there is still
some confusion in lower courts how to apply the standards clarified and set forth in Comcast. 212 This sentiment was addressed in
Jacob v. Duane Reed, Inc., which was a class action dispute
heard in the Southern District of New York. 213 The Judge in Jacob noted that lower courts are struggling to determine the scope
of the Comcast holding. 214 He noted that there are three categories
of decisions that are emerging post–Comcast: (1) courts differenti-
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208
The suit included over twenty-seven different types of front-loading
washers. Further, the plaintiffs included individuals who do not actually suffer from any mold problem in their washer.
209
See generally Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Butler, 133 S. Ct. 2768 (2013)
(granting certiorari in light of the decision in Comcast).
210
Butler, 133 S. Ct. at 2768. However, upon remand Judge Posner again
held that the case was properly certified despite the holding in Comcast. Butler, 727 F.3d at 799.
211
This is evident in the Supreme Court’s recent grants of certiorari,
which vacated the decisions of the lower courts and remanded for further proceedings. See Butler, 133 S. Ct. at 2768, and Whirlpool Corp., 133 S. Ct. at
1722.
212
See generally Jacob v. Duane Reade Inc., 289 F.R.D. 408 (S.D.N.Y.
March 20, 2013). But see generally Jacob v. Duane Reade Inc., 293 F.R.D. 578
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying certification for both the damages and liability
claims). On reconsideration in light of Comcast, the court held that issue of
damages could not be resolved on a class-wide basis. The court certified the
class solely on the issue of liability, as damages would need to be calculated
through the use of individualized proof, which would prevent the class from
meeting the predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at 595.
213
Jacob, 293 F.R.D. at 581.
214
Id.
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Id.
Jacob, 293 F.R.D. at 593; See Whirlpool Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1722 (holding that in light of Comcast the decision needed to be remanded back to the
sixth circuit to be reassessed).
217
Whirlpool Corp., 678 F.3d at 421.
218
Id.
219
Jacob, 293 F.R.D. at 587 (citing to Whirlpool II where the Court distinguishes between cases like Comcast and cases that solely deal with liability
issues). In sum, these courts view Comcast’s scope of Comcast to be more limited especially when damages are not at issue.
220
Id. (quoting Comcast, 133 S. Ct at 1435) (“The first step in a damages
study is the translation of the legal theory of the harmful event into an analysis
of the economic impact of that event.”).
221
Id. at 588.
216
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ating the fact pattern from the facts found in Comcast and suggesting a common formula to meet the predominance standard;
(2) courts noting that there is no common formula present for the
calculation of damages and thus applying Comcast; and (3) courts
somewhat applying the standard set forth in Comcast and using
Rule 23(c)(4) to employ only a liability standard as opposed to also calculating damages in the same stage. 215
Although Comcast does not explicitly provide guidance regarding Rule 23(c)(4), in light of the holding the Supreme Court
recently vacated and remanded a case similarly to Butler in
Whirlpool Corp., v. Glazer. 216 In Whirlpool, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the question of liability should be tried as a class
action and the issue of damages may be treated individually at a
later time. 217 Besides separating the issue of liability and damages, the Sixth Circuit suggested separating the class into small subclasses for determining damages. 218 This approach did not come
up during the discussion of Comcast, but may have been an alternative for the plaintiffs to address in the event that they reworked
the damage model accounting for the one successful liability theory and the various counties involved.
The lower courts appear to be grappling with cases that
involve only liability issues and how Comcast would apply in
those scenarios. 219 It appears then that Comcast will most often be
applied and followed in cases where liability and damages are in
dispute, with an emphasis placed on the fact that the theory of liability is tied to the theory on damages. 220 Thus, an inquiry into
the relationship between damages and theories of liability is prudent prior to consideration of certification. 221
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Comcast v. Behrend is an example of the evolution of class
action and reemphasized the importance of proper certification.
By ensuring that the lower courts employ a stricter interpretation
of implementing a rigorous analysis, it ensures proper certification. While at first glance the holding appears to place a greater
burden on consumers, the future does not seem hopeless for potential consumer classes. The case in Comcast could have easily
been decided the other way if the damage model presented
matched the accepted theories of liability to their respective damages. This suggests that while Comcast will undoubtedly have an
impact on future cases, the applicability may not be as detrimental to consumers as commentators have suggested. In reality,
this holding provides further guidance to potential classes seeking
certification. The documentation submitted during discovery will
most likely need to be more in depth than was the case in the
past. Thus, Comcast will be influential in the future of class actions to the benefit of both parties. By requiring evidence to be
scrutinized at a higher standard, consumers are awarded some
protection from being denied certification based on inadmissible
evidence. By delving into the merits early on, it helps courts ensure that certification is proper.
While the holding in Comcast will alter the procedure lower courts employ in determining class certification, it appears
there is still some confusion. Lower courts have distinguished liability cases from lawsuits involving both liability and damages.
Another potential consequence is the increased use of subclasses
to assist in determining damages. The use of subclasses was not
discussed in Comcast, but would have likely altered the majority’s ruling.
While the Court had the opportunity to delve into the application of a Daubert analysis but failed to thoroughly address it,
the Court did reinforce the idea that circuit courts can no longer
refuse to rigorously analyze Rule 23. However, because the decision was so recent, and circuits are already finding ways to distinguish cases, it is unclear just how far the application of Comcast will reach.
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